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Empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic reforms is limited 
to few reforms, countries, and years. This paper studies the impact of democracy on the 
adoption of economic reforms using a new dataset on reforms in the financial, capital and 
banking sectors, product markets, agriculture, and trade for 150 countries over the period 
1960–2004. Democracy has a positive and significant impact on the adoption of economic 
reforms but there is no evidence that economic reforms foster democracy. Our results are 
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1.  Introduction 
  Political and economic freedoms go hand in hand … or do they not? This is one of 
the oldest questions in economics and in political science, which is still largely unanswered. 
This paper answers this question using a novel dataset on economic reforms, which is the 
most exhaustive in the literature in terms of countries, years, and range of reform coverage.  
This question is still open because there are very good theoretical arguments and 
numerous examples as to why political freedom can either hinder or facilitate economic 
reforms. Take the historical examples of Chile under Pinochet, or South Korea under Park. 
In both cases, important economic reforms were undertaken under dictatorial regimes.  The 
majority of the contemporary industrialized countries were not democracies when they took 
off (Schwarz, 1992). In most cases, East Asian economies did develop under undemocratic 
regimes. In addition to these historical examples from every region of the world and 
different historical periods, there are compelling theoretical reasons as to why less 
democratic regimes may favor economic reforms and growth. 
A fully democratic regime can fall prey to interest groups, which put their goals 
before general well being. Sometimes, capitalists entrenched in their rent-seeking positions 
are the main opponents of economic reforms. In a newly independent country only a 
‘benevolent dictator’ can shelter the institutions, avoid that the state becomes captive of any 
specific interest group, and allow the state to perform its function in an efficient way.
1 In 
particular, interest groups can block reforms if there is uncertainty about the distribution of 
the benefits (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). In addition to pressure from interest groups, 
democracy can lead to excessive private and public consumption and lack of sufficient 
investment (Huntington, 1968); so dictatorial regimes can rely on financial repression to 
increase the domestic saving rate. Wages are typically higher under democracy (Rodrik, 1999). 
Several countries, including the Soviet Union and many East Asian countries, have been able 
to increase savings, and ultimately achieve high economic growth rate, thanks to a repressive 
political system and an attendant highly regulated financial system. In conclusion, do the 
historical examples and the theoretical arguments provide a compelling case against the role 
of democracy in fostering economic reforms? The answer to this question is a resounding no. 
                                                 
1 Along these lines, Haggard (1990) argues “... Institutions can overcome collective-action dilemmas 
by restraining the self-interested behavior of groups through sanctions: collective action problems 
can be resolved by command.”     
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The alternative view that democracy often accompanies economic reforms is also 
based on strong theoretical arguments and solid empirical evidence. Secured property rights, 
as guaranteed by a democracy, are considered key to economic development. In general, 
dictators cannot credibly make commitments because of time-inconsistency; so no reform 
can be undertaken (McGuire and Olson, 1996). Autocratic rulers tend to be predatory, 
disrupting economic activity and making any reform effort meaningless; autocratic regimes 
have also an interest in postponing reforms and maintaining rent-generating activities for a 
restricted number of supporting groups. On the opposite, democratic rulers should be more 
sensitive to the interest of the public, and so more willing to implement reforms, which 
destroy monopolies in favor of the general interests. In addition to these theoretical 
arguments, there is strong empirical evidence that reforms are highly correlated with 
democracy. 
The correlation between democracy and economic reforms is very strong both 
across time and in a cross section. Figure 1 shows the correlation over time between the 
indices of democracy (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1) and reform 
(all the indices are normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the least reformed 
and 1 to the most reformed) in the following six sectors (or areas)2—(i) domestic financial, (ii) 
capital account, (iii) product markets (electricity and telecommunications), (iv) agriculture,  (v) 
trade (based on tariffs) and (vi) current account transactions—over time.3 All the cases show 
a strong correlation between democracy and regulation, with democracy usually preceding 
the deregulation process. Figure 2 shows that the correlation holds very strongly also when 
we take a cross section: countries that are more democratic are also more reformed. 
However, these correlations in themselves do not show that democracy necessarily causes 
economic reforms. The correlation could run in the opposite direction, or both democracy 
and economic reforms could be driven by a common third factor.  
The sharp contrast between these opposing views has left the question of the effects 
of democracy on economic reforms largely unanswered. The goal of this paper is to address 
again this issue using a novel database, which covers almost 150 countries, 6 sectors and 
spanning more than 40 years of data.  
                                                 
2 We will use the term “sector” in the rest of the paper to denote the broad area in which the reforms 
take place. 
3 See below for data description.     
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The main findings are that an increase in the quality of democratic institutions is 
significantly correlated with the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence of a 
feedback effect from economic to political liberalization. These results are robust to 
controlling for country, reform-specific effects and any possible interaction among them. 
Global reform waves and possible country-time varying determinants of reforms (including 
crises, reforms in neighboring countries, existence of compensation for losers, human capital 
and bureaucratic quality, and several political variables) do not weaken these results, which 
are also robust to using an instrumental variable strategy.    
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on economic reforms and democracy; Section 3 presents the data; Section 4 
presents the results on the effects of democracy on reforms, controlling for other possible 
determinants of reforms and the possibility of reverse causality and omitted variables; 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Democracy and Reforms: Theory and Empirics 
While there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature that considers the 
determinants of economic reforms in general, there is scarce evidence, particularly empirical, 
on the relationship between democracy and reforms.
4  
  Economic theory does not give a clear answer on whether political liberalizations 
favor or hinder economic reforms or if the relationship could go both ways. Democratic 
regimes could lead to more reforms if reforms create more winners than losers (Giavazzi 
and Tabellini, 2005). Democratically elected governments may also have greater legitimacy to 
implement and sustain policies bearing high short-term costs; similarly institutional 
changes—e.g., strengthening an independent legal system or a professional civil service 
required to ensure political freedom and democracy—could lead also to successful market 
reforms. Finally, democracy could create an environment conducive to economic reforms by 
limiting rent-seeking and putting in place a system of checks and balances (Dethier, Ghanem 
and Zoli, 1999).  
  Alternatively, political liberalization could lead to less economic reforms if the 
electoral system creates a pivotal voter with veto power. For instance, it has been argued that 
                                                 
4 For some recent papers, see Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2005), Abiad and Mody (2005), Drazen 
and Easterly (2001), and Lora (1998).      
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Chile in the late 70s and the 80s implemented several forward-looking economic reforms 
because the military regime did not have to respond to a short-sighted electorate. At the 
same time, it has been argued that Costa Rica has been a laggard in economic reforms 
because the democratic system gives veto power to groups that can lose from reforms. 
Democratic legislators are more likely to adopt time-inconsistent policies (Quinn 2000). In 
fact, uncertainty about the impact of economic reforms at the individual level could also lead 
a rational electorate to vote against reforms even if they are known ex ante to benefit a 
majority of them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).  
  The theoretical predictions about the feedback effect from economic reforms to 
democratization are ambiguous as well. For example, economic liberalizations could be 
associated with higher quality of democratic institutions if they increase the power of the 
middle class (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). On the other hand, liberalization could lower 
democracy through increases in income inequality and the associated political strife and 
violence (Quinn, 1997, Dixon and Boswell, 1996).  
  On the empirical side, only a few empirical papers have looked at the relationship 
between democracy and reforms. Among the available evidence, Giavazzi and Tabellini 
(2005) study the feedback effects between economic and political liberalizations. Economic 
liberalization is defined as the event of becoming open, where openness is defined as in 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Political liberalization is the event of becoming a democracy; 
where democracy is defined by strictly positive values of polity2. Using a panel of 140 
countries over 1960–2000 (with country and year fixed effects), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) 
find evidence of a positive and significant relationship between democratizations and trade 
reforms; they find that the feedback effect could run in both directions although the 
causality is more likely to run from political to economic reforms. In comparison, we find 
little evidence of feedback effects from reforms to democracy.5 Similarly, Persson (2005) 
shows that the forms of democracy (parliamentary, proportional and permanent ones) are 
important in explaining variation in trade reforms (measured by the Wacziarg and Welch 
index) and an index protection of property rights.6  Amin and Djankov (2009) show that 
                                                 
5 Not, however, that the results are not directly comparable because Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) 
consider only trade reforms. 
6 Banerji and Ghanem (1997), and Milner and Kubota (2005) also look at trade reforms. The former 
presents cross-country evidence to show that authoritarian regimes are associated with higher 
protectionism (measured by an index of protectionism from Dollar (1992)), while the latter show that     
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democracy (measured by Freedom House or PolityIV scores) is good for micro-reforms (as 
defined in the World Bank’s Doing Business Database).7 Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) 
find evidence of a positive two-way relationship between democracy and globalization 
defined as trade and capital account liberalization.8 They, however, find that these effects are 
not uniform across time and space. 
  Quinn (2000) examines the relationship between democracy and international 
financial liberalization. He measures international financial regulation through changes in 
current and capital account openness created using the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions from the IMF. Democracy is measured by changes in polity2. Quinn uses both 
panel data techniques and individual country VARs for 40–50 countries over 1950–97 and 
finds evidence that democracies liberalize international finance, especially capital accounts. 
Unlike this paper, he also finds evidence of feedback effects from financial liberalization to 
democratizations whereby capital account liberalization is associated with decreases in 
democracy 6 to 15 years later.9 Finally, Olper, Falkowski and Swinnen (2009) study the effect 
of regime transitions from autocracy to democracy on agricultural policy distortions, 
measured by indicators of government transfers to the agriculture sector. They find that 
while agriculture protection increases after a country’s transition to democracy, there is no 
effect when the regime shifts from democracy to autocracy. 
  Other papers examine the relationship between economic and political liberalizations 
in the context of post-communist countries. For example, Fidrmuc (2003) in a sample of 
25 transition countries over 1990-2000 finds a positive relationship between the indices of 
                                                                                                                                                 
regime changes towards democracy are associated with greater liberalization (measured by tariff rates 
and Sachs Warner indices). Banerji and Ghanem (1997) also find evidence that more authoritarian 
regimes are associated with greater wage distortions, as measured by the ratio of manufacturing wage 
rate to the nonmanufacturing value added per worker. 
7 Micro-reforms are defined as reforms that lower the administrative costs of starting or running a 
business. The World Bank’s Doing Business Database dataset covers only the last 5 years so a long-
term analysis is not possible. 
8 Their measure of trade liberalization is imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP; the authors also 
check the robustness of their results using the dichotomous measure of Wacziarg and Welch (2004). 
Capital controls are measured combining information from the International Monetary Fund’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions together with historical data taken 
from Eichengreen and Bordo (2003). 
9 Mulligan, Gill and Sala-i-Martin (2004) do not look specifically at reforms, but analyze the effect of 
democracy on public spending and taxes. They do not find any significant relationship between 
democracy and total government consumption, education or social spending; but find that 
democracies are associated with flatter income taxes (or less income redistribution).        
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liberalization and democracy. Liberalization is measured by an average of various reform 
indicators developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development covering 
privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign 
exchange, competition policy, and banking and securities markets. Democracy is measured 
by an average of the indicators of political rights and civil liberties reported by the Freedom 
House. In a similar vein, Dethier, Ghanem, and Zoli (1999) also find that political freedom 
and civil liberties facilitated economic liberalization in the 25 post-communist countries 
between 1992 and 1997. Milner and Mukerjee (2009) find evidence that democracy fosters 
trade and capital account liberalization, but also that the impact of openness of democracy is 
quite weak in developing countries. Grosjean and Senik (forthcoming) using a survey 
conducted in 2006 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
World Bank in 28 post-transition countries find a significant effect of democracy (measured 
by the Freedom House democracy score) on market liberalization, but no evidence of a 
feedback effect. In addition to the statistical analysis, some papers (Bates and Krueger, 1993) 
have focused on case studies. This approach takes into account the complexity and the 
country specificity of the interaction between democracy and economic reforms.  
  To summarize, while there are many theoretical predictions about the relationships 
between political and economic liberalizations, empirical evidence on the subject is limited to 
reforms in particular sectors,  in particular international trade and finance, micro-reforms, or 
specific countries over a short period.  
Our study is the first one to combine a comprehensive coverage of reforms in 
different sectors, a significant coverage of countries and a long time period. In particular, the 
dataset used in this paper spans six sectors, and both developing and developed countries 
from the 1960 up until 2004. 
    
3.  Data 
3.1. Data on reforms 
Our analysis is based on a completely new and extensive dataset, compiled by the 
Research Department of the IMF, describing the degree of regulation for a sample of 150 
industrial and developing countries. The new dataset thus has significant advantages over 
existing data sources, which cover a narrower set of reforms and countries. Reform 
indicators cover six sectors, including both financial and real sectors. Financial sector reform     
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indicators include reforms pertaining to domestic financial markets and the external capital 
account, while real sector structural reform indicators include measures of product and 
agriculture markets, trade, and current account reforms. Each indicator contains different 
sub-indices summarizing different dimensions of the regulatory environment in each sector. 
The sub-indices are then aggregated into indices and normalized between 0 and 1. We 
construct all the measures of reform in each sector so that higher values represent greater 
degrees of liberalization.  
Table 1 presents a brief definition and sources of the reform indicators used in this 
paper. IMF (2008) describes all data sources and full details of the construction of the 
indicators. 
3.1.1. Financial sector reforms in the domestic financial market 
The dataset contains two measures of financial sector reforms, one for the domestic 
financial sector and the other regarding the extent of capital account liberalization. The 
domestic financial sector liberalization indicator in turn includes measures of securities markets 
and banking sector reforms. The securities markets subindex assesses the quality of the market 
framework, including the existence of an independent regulator and the extent of legal 
restrictions on the development of domestic bond and equity markets. The banking subindex 
captures reductions or removal of interest rate controls (floors or ceilings), credit controls 
(directed credit and subsidized lending), competition restrictions (limits on branches and 
entry barriers in the banking market, including licensing requirements or limits on foreign 
banks), and public ownership of banks. The banking index also captures a measure of the 
quality of banking supervision and regulation, including the power and independence of 
bank supervisors, the adoption of Basel capital standards, and the presence of a framework 
for bank inspections. 
3.1.2. Capital account liberalization 
The second measure of reform in the financial sector pertains to the extent of the 
external capital account liberalization. The index contains information on a broad set of 
restrictions including, for example, controls on external borrowing between residents and 
non-residents, as well as approval requirements for foreign direct investment (FDI).  
3.1.3. Product market reforms 
Turning to the real sector, the product market indicator covers the degree of 
liberalization in the telecommunication and electricity markets, including the extent of     
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competition in the provision of these services, the presence of an independent regulatory 
authority, and privatization. 
 
3.1.4. Agricultural market reforms 
The agricultural sector indicator captures intervention in the market for the main 
agricultural export commodity in each country. It measures the extent of public intervention 
in the market going from total monopoly or monopsony in production, transportation or 
marketing (i.e., the presence of marketing boards), the presence of administered prices, 
public ownership of relevant producers or concession requirement to free market. 
3.1.5. Trade reforms 
Trade reforms are captured by using two different indicators: one based on tariffs 
and the other measuring the extent of current account liberalization. The indicator based on 
tariff liberalization is meant to capture distortions in international trade and is measured by 
average tariffs.  
3.1.6. Current account liberalization reforms   
The second indicator for measuring reform in the trade sector broadly measures the 
extent of current account liberalization. It captures the extent to which a government is 
compliant with its obligations under the IMF’s Article VIII to free from government 
restriction the proceeds from international trade in goods and services.  
Additional details on the sources and specifics of each indicator can be found in IMF 
(2008) and Table 1. 
3.2. Aggregation and normalization 
For each of our six sectors, we construct an aggregate index by averaging the sub-
indices for that particular sector (for the cases in which we do have multiple sub-indices, like 
product market or the financial sector). Each sectoral indicator is then normalized between 0 
and 1, where 1 indicates a higher degree of liberalization. “Reform” in any sector is then 
defined as an annual change in the index. Table 2 reports the pair wise correlations between 
different types of reforms. Financial sector, trade, current, and capital account reforms are 
strongly correlated among themselves, and less so with agricultural and product market 
reforms (with the exception of the financial sector reform which is strongly correlated to 
product market reforms). Overall the correlations indicate that once the process of reform in     
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a country starts, it probably spreads over to several sectors.10 We run most of our regressions 
at the sector-country and year level; however as one of our robustness checks we also 
aggregate the six reform indicators using a principal component analysis.  
3.3. Other data 
Democracy is measured using the standard, well-established measure of democracy 
taken from the Polity IV database. In particular, we use the combined polity2 index ranging 
from -10 to 10 (-10=high autocracy; 10=high democracy).
11 We normalize the index so that 
1 indicates the most democratic country and 0 the least democratic regime. 
We also include in our specifications the following controls: 
  Initial level of regulation (as measured by the lagged level of the regulation index): 
this variable can be a proxy for important incentives in favor and against the 
implementation of structural reforms. Excessive government regulation and/or 
market failures may be perceived as more costly when the economy is least reformed. 
At the same time, the beneficiaries of existing large rents may oppose reforms. 
  Economic crisis: According to a widely held view, economic crises foster economic 
reforms by making evident the cost of stagnation and backwardness. The opposite 
view maintains that it is easier to implement reforms during periods of economic 
growth when potential losers can find other opportunities in a booming economy or 
when countries become richer and have more resources to compensate the losers. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we use several measures of crisis: a dummy equal to 1 if 
the country is experiencing inflation larger than 40 percent in that year, a measure for 
recession (as summarized by a dummy indicating negative growth in per-capita 
GDP), terms of trade shocks, and banking and debt crisis.12 
                                                 
10 This paper does not consider the issue of sequencing among different types of reforms. For an 
analysis of sequencing see IMF (2008), showing that trade reforms tend to precede financial and 
capital account reforms. 
11 We also check our results using the Freedom House Index and the index proposed by Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1993). For an exhaustive discussion of these indices, see Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) or Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Note that the trend 
toward more democratic regimes has not been linear. Significant retrenchment of democracy has not 
only been observed in isolated countries but also in several regions of the world. The examples 
include the general decrease in democracy in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, the marked decline in 
Latin America in 1960s and 1970s, and the prolonged stasis in Africa since the 1960s (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006).  
12 The data on banking and debt crises come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).      
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  Public expenditures/GDP and real devaluation: Compensation schemes can 
offset costs associated with reforms. A large government may compensate losers 
from reforms than a very lean government with a small budget. We use public 
expenditures/GDP as a proxy of the size of social safety nets.  As an alternative 
measure of compensation, we also control for real devaluation, which could promote 
exports and therefore help compensate losers from reforms.13 
  Human capital and effectiveness of bureaucracy could also facilitate reforms 
(Besley and Personn, 2007). We use enrollment in tertiary education from Barro and 
Lee (2001) as a measure of human capital and bureaucratic quality from the 
International Country Risk Guide.14  
  Reforms in neighboring countries or in trading partners may affect the adoption 
of domestic reforms through peer pressure and imitational effects. We use the 
weighted average of reforms in neighboring countries, where the weights are given 
by two concepts of distance defined by geography and trade.
15 
  The ideology of the ruling government and the form of government may 
determine the adoption of reforms.16 We capture the ideological orientation of the 
executive with the indicator left, which is equal to 1 if the executive belongs to a party 
of the left and 0 if it belongs to a right-wing, centrist or other party. The form of 
government is proxied by the variable presidential, which takes the value of 1 if the 
system is directly presidential and 0 if the president is elected by the assembly or 
parliamentary. The source for these two variables is the Database of Political 
Institutions from the World Bank.17 
                                                 
13 For instance, some important reforms happened together with large devaluation and in the context 
of IMF-supported programs.  
14 The  measure of bureaucratic quality from ICRG is scored between 0-6. High scores indicate 
“autonomy from political pressure” and “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services”; also existence of an “established mechanism for 
recruiting and training.” 
15 The source for geographic distance is http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm and 
for bilateral trade flows, the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
16  Alesina and Roubini (1992) argue that right-wing governments are normally considered more 
inclined to market-oriented reforms; Persson and Tabellini (2002) finds that a presidential system 
facilitates reforms as they are more able to overcome the resistance of small interest groups.  
17 We also included in the regressions additional political variables such as number of executive 
constraints, the presence of legislative or executive elections, the number of years left in the current     
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Table A1 provides the summary statistics for the key variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.  Empirical strategy 
The unit of analysis is a sector-country-year observation (there are 6 sectors, 150 
countries, and 45 years); the resulting dataset is a panel of 20,123 observations. We define 
reform as a change over time in the index of regulation for each of the six sectors, s, in 
country c at time t: 
  ,, ,, ,, 1 s ct sct sct reform Index Index   ,  
Our baseline specification is as follows: 
       , ,                  , ,                           ,            ,               
                   , ,           ( 1 )  
where  s  ,  c   and  t   are sector, country, and year fixed effects, respectively, and 
1  ct X  are country-specific and time-varying controls to be described below.      and      
represent the interactions between country and sector; and sector and time fixed effects 
respectively.  We also control for the lagged level of the index to identify the existence of 
convergence toward some possible country specific levels of regulation.  
The dependent variable (reform) is highly persistent; for this reason the error terms 
in specification (1) may also exibit serial correlation. 18  We allow for first-order serial 
correlation in the error terms: 1 ct ct ct u      .
19 In specifications (2) and (4), we allow the 
serial correlation coefficient in the error term to be country-sector specific.20 In specification 
(3), we allow the serial correlation coefficient to be country specific. In Table 7b we also test 
the robustness of our results by clustering the error terms at the country level.  
Our first specification includes only sector, country, and time fixed effects (Table 3, 
column 1). The coefficient on the lagged level of the index is negative and significant at the 1 
percent level, indicating convergence toward country specific levels of regulation. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
term for the executive and the presence of an absolute majority in the legislature by the party of the 
executive. The results are robust to the inclusion of these additional political variables. 
18 Note, however, that the reform variables do not have a unit root being bounded between zero and 
one. 
19 The Durbin-Watson statistics is 1.94 indicating that there is little evidence of serial correlation in 
the error terms.     
20 Note that specifications (2)–(4) reduce slightly the estimation sample because one observation per 
country is used to calculate the correlation coefficient of the error terms.         
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coefficient on the lagged level of democracy is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
magnitude of the estimated effect implies that a one standard deviation increase in the 
democracy index explains 7 percent variability in reforms. In addition, moving to a complete 





 increase in the index of reform 
(using the coefficients of column 1).       
  We then add country-sector specific effects, and sector-year specific effects and both 
of them (column 2, 3 and 4 respectively). The interactions between country and sector fixed 
effects take into account that reforms are inherently different across countries, e.g., trade 
sector reforms in India have different characteristics than banking reforms in Brazil 
(Specification 2). The interactions between sector and year effects account for the possibility 
of global reform waves across all countries (Specification 3). Specification 4 is the most 
demanding because it includes all the individual fixed effects and possible two-way 
interactions. Notice that we cannot control for country-time effects, since the main variable 
of interest, which is democracy, tends to be country-time varying. The results are very similar 
across specifications. The magnitude of the coefficients on the democracy variable range 
from 0.02 to 0.03 in columns 2-4. 
The results in Table 3 show that the correlation between (past) democracy level and the 
adoption of reforms is not driven by country or sector-fixed characteristics or by the fact 
that there was a worldwide movement toward reforms and democracy, or any interactions 
between country-sector and sector-time fixed characteristics.  
If the correlation between economic reforms and democracy is not due to spurious 
correlation owing to a common trend, could it be driven by other country-time varying 
omitted variables? The next subsection checks whether this correlation is robust to the 
inclusion of several variables, which (current theories suggest) may explain both economic 
reforms and democracy, i.e., the possible bias deriving from country-sector-time varying 
omitted variables.  
4.1. Additional controls 
Reforms may be triggered by a wide range of factors other than democracy. 
Following the theoretical literature reviewed above, in Table 4 we control for the following 
possible determinants of reforms: a measure of crisis (a dummy equal to 1 if the country is     
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experienced inflation larger than 40 percent) 21 , public expenditure/GDP and real 
devaluation, human capital and bureaucratic quality, reforms in neighbors, and political 
variables (columns 1-5). 
In many countries, difficult fiscal situations were associated with monetization of 
deficit and high inflation. For this reason, we take hyperinflation (defined as inflation larger 
than 40 percent) as an indicator of (unresolved) fiscal crisis.  Not surprisingly,  episodes of 
hyperinflation appear to reduce the probability of reforming (Column 1), although the effect 
is small and significant only at the 10% level. Moreover, when we include all the controls in 
column (6), only initial structural conditions and democracy appear to be significant in 
explaining reforms 22. Bureaucratic quality and public expenditure/GDP also appear to 
matter but with coefficients which are low and only significant at the 10% level. 
Of all the variables, reforms in neighboring countries appear to spur domestic 
reforms.
23 This result, which extends the results of IMF (2004) on OECD countries, is also 
in line with Buera, Monge, and Primiceri (2008), who find a spillover effect from beliefs in 
neighboring countries. The inclusion of these variables does not decrease the significance of 
democracy in explaining the adoption of reforms. 
  
4.2. Endogeneity 
Another source of bias derives from the fact that reforms themselves may have an 
effect on democracy. In order to deal with this issue we have two approaches: 1) we use 
instrumental variables, and 2) we check if reforms cause democracy (in the final section of 
the paper). 
While an ideal source of exogenous variation of democracy is difficult to find, we use 
democracy in neighboring countries as an instrument where we introduce the concept of 
                                                 
21 We include alternative measures of crisis in Table 7b. 
22 For each column in Table 4, we also estimate the basic specification (Table 3, column 4) on the 
restricted sample with fewer observations (not shown) to analyze the effect of adding controls on a 
consistent sample. The results shown in Table 4 do not appear to be driven by sample selection. We 
also include additional controls viz. dummies for WTO, EU, and OECD accessions (=1 in years 
following the accession); and for the existence of an IMF program. Democracy continues to have a 
positive and statistical effect on reforms, after controlling for these. Accession to EU and OECD; 
and the existence of an IMF program are significant in explaining reforms; however, they are not 
significant when included with all the controls in column (6) of Table 4 (results are available upon 
request).  
23 The controls are described in the data section. Note also that the different control variables reduce 
substantially the sample size.      
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political distance to define the neighbors. The idea behind this instrument is that democracy 
in political allies has influence on domestic democracy but no direct impact on a country’s 
ability to reform. For instance, the political alliance between the U.S. and Western Europe 
had surely an effect on democracy in Western Europe but not a direct effect on the reform 
level in Europe. 24 
Table 5A shows the regressions using lagged democracy in political neighbors as an 
instrumental variable. As expected, the first-stage F  statistics confirm the relevance of 
democracy in neighbors in promoting the democratic process in the domestic economy (the 
first stage of our IV regression is presented in Table 5B). The results in our second stage 
show that, consistent with the OLS specification, there is evidence for a strong and positive 
effect of democracy on reforms. Notice that the estimated effect is not statistically 
significant in the specification which includes all the controls (column 1c). The magnitude of 
the estimated effect is, however, not significantly different from Column 1b, which uses a 
larger sample and a restricted set of controls suggesting that the statistical insignificance in 
specification 1c is likely to be driven by the large standard errors from the smaller sample. 
The regression in column 1d, where the sample is the same as column 1c but without the 
inclusion of controls, indeed confirms that this is the case. 
 
4.3. Regressions by sector 
Does democracy have a differential effect across sectors? Alternatively, are the 
results presented above driven by a particular sector? We explore this possibility by looking 
at the impact of democracy on different sectors. The results in Table 6 show that, with the 
exception of product markets (electricity/telecommunication), democracy promotes reforms 
in all other sectors, with the estimated effect being statistically significant at the one percent 
level in all sectors. The fact that democracy is not significant in explaining reforms in 
electricity/telecommunications may be due to the fact that global waves (which are captured 
by year effects) drive the adoptions of reforms in these sectors. 
                                                 
24 The idea underlying this instrument is based on Persson and Tabellini (2009), who use democracy 
in neighboring countries as a proxy for democratic capital. In addition, building on this concept, we 
also tried different measures of distance, including geographical distance between countries and 
commercial distance defined as the (inverse of) trading flows between countries. While these 
measures are highly correlated, they confirm the result of political distance reported here.      
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We prefer the general specification that encompasses all sectors in order to maximize 
the number of observations so that we can control for country, reform, and year fixed 
effects and (most importantly) their interactions as shown in Table 3. 
 
4.4 Other robustness checks 
In Table 7a, we carry out several robustness checks.25 In columns 1a–1b and 2a–2b, 
the sample is restricted to communist and developing countries respectively (we estimate 
two regressions for each subsample with and without the inclusion of controls). In columns 
3a-3b, we use a zero-one definition of democracy (as in Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005), where 
democracy=1 if polity2 has positive values. Using a zero-one definition of democracy does 
not change our results (the results are weaker when we include all the controls, but this is 
driven by the fact that the sample size is much smaller, in column 3c we indeed show that 
the impact of democracy on reform on the restricted sample but without the inclusion of 
controls is also not significant). Table 7b shows that the results are also robust to different 
standard error corrections (instead of explicitly allowing for an AR(1) term in the model, the 
standard errors are clustered at the country-reform level) (column 1). Reforms in trading 
partners (column 2) and reforms in other sectors (column 3) also do not alter our main 
conclusion, and the results are also robust to a variety of crisis definitions (negative per-
capita GDP growth, banking and debt crises and terms-of-trade shocks-columns 4 to 7). We 
also find very similar results when we follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and include a 
political reform variable defined as a dummy taking the value of 1 in the years after 
democratization (where democratization is defined as the event of becoming a democracy, 
given that a country was not a democracy in the previous year)26.  
  By including the lagged level of reform, the specifications so far have assumed that 
there is (conditional) convergence in the reform adoption.
27  However, unlike growth 
regressions, there is no theoretical reason why we should expect convergence in the level of 
                                                 
25 For each specification with controls in Table 7a, we also estimated the basic specification (Table 3, 
column 4) without any controls on the restricted sample (not shown). We do this to analyze the 
effect of adding controls on a consistent sample. The results in Table 7a are not driven by sample 
selection. 
26 Results are reported in column 8. 
27 Note, however, that we assume a country specific long run level of reforms by putting country 
fixed effects.      
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regulation. In order to test if our results depend on this assumption, we replicate the 
specification in Table 3 without the lagged reform index using the following specification:  
∆      , ,               ,          ,                                   , ,   (2) 
Column (9) in Table 7b reports the results from estimating Equation (2). The 
estimated coefficient on lagged (democracy) is positive and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient (β= 0.011) is smaller than in 
Table 3.
28  This coefficient, however, is not exactly comparable to the coefficient in the 
previous regressions in Table 3 given that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on 
democracy in this regression can be interpreted only as the effect of democracy on the rate of 
adoption of structural reforms rather than on the steady-state level.
29  
Finally, in Table 8, we find some evidence for non-linear effects of democracy on 
reforms: the more democratic the country is initially, the easier it is to reform.
30  
 
 4.5. The feedback effect 
  In this section, we check whether economic reforms could foster the democratic 
process in a country. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) find evidence of a possible feedback 
effect from economic liberalization (when looking only at the trade sector) and the 
democratic process. We test for the possibility of a feedback effect from reforms to 
democracy by estimating the following regression  
 Δ          ,               ,               , ,                       ,        (3) 
Overall, we find that democracy promotes reform, while we do not find any 
evidence that reforms promote the democratic process (Table 9a).31 Our results therefore do 
                                                 
28 This is consistent with a positive correlation between (lagged) democracy and the lagged reform 
index, and a negative relationship between reform and the lagged reform index. 
29 Note that unlike Equation (1), the specification in Equation (2) has the drawback that the steady 
state level of the index is undefined; hence the long-run effect of democracy on the reform index 
cannot be estimated. In  effect , we are assuming that a certain level of democracy is associated only 
with a rate of growth of the reform index. Column (9) in Table 7b repeats only the final specification 
in Table 3 without the lagged reform index. The estimated coefficient on lagged democracy is 
identical when we replicate columns (1)-(3) in Table 3 without the lagged reform index (results 
available upon request). 
30 We also explore whether democracy affects the probability of reversal in reforms (defined as a 
decrease in the level of index) and do not find any evidence for this hypothesis.   
31  For robustness, we also estimate Equation (3) with longer lags; but do not evidence for any 
feedback effects (results available on request).     
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not support a reverse causality story.32 We also repeat the same exercise reform by reform 
and find little evidence of feedback for most reforms with the exception of reforms in 
domestic financial sector and current account. Reforms in these sectors seem to reduce the 
probability of democratization.  The results are qualitatively similar to Giavazzi and Tabellini 
(2005), who argue that for trade reforms, “causality is more likely to run from political to 
economic liberalizations rather than vice versa”.  
  
4.6. Factor analysis 
In this section, we implement a different approach from the panel analysis presented 
above. To take into account the possibility that the reform process is one unique process 
common to all sectors, we undertake a factor analysis of our measures of reforms in the six 
sectors. In particular, we extract the first principal component from the whole dataset with 
all the data on reforms for each sector.33 The results are reported in Table 10. The impact of 
democracy seems to be relevant for the overall tendency of a country to reform (the 
coefficient on the lagged level of democracy is significant at the 1 percent level): moving to a 
complete democracy in the long-run is associated with a 0.03 increase in the index of reform 
(the magnitude doubles when we instrument for lagged democracy using lagged democracy 
in neighboring countries). On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of a feedback 
effect from the impact of the overall tendency of a country to reform on democracy.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
  The question of whether democratic countries favor economic reforms is central to 
the political economy literature. Political economists study why apparently welfare-enhancing 
reforms are postponed or adopted with long delays and the presence (or the absence) of 
democracy is one of the main causes investigated. Unfortunately, despite the vast theoretical 
literature and limited empirical evidence (restricted to some set of countries, to some 
reforms and to some periods), the answer to this question has been tentative because of data 
limitations, which has also limited the techniques that can be used. 
                                                 
32 Since income is considered an important determinant of democratization, we also test robustness 
to including per capita income in the regressions (results available upon request). Including the lagged 
level of the index, rather than the change as in Table 9a, also does not alter the findings in Table 9a.  
33 The variable is then normalized between 0 and 1 to make the results comparable to the remaining 
part of the paper.      
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  This paper answers this question using a novel dataset on structural reforms, which 
encompasses several sectors and many countries for several years. This dataset allows us to 
control for a set of possible omitted variables, including country and reform fixed effects, 
possible two-way interactions between the fixed effects and waves of reforms. 
  The main conclusions of the papers are that 1) democracy and economic reforms are 
positively correlated (after controlling for country and reform-specific characteristics, any 
interaction between country and reform characteristics, and global reform waves); 2) this 
correlation is robust even after we control for standard factors, which are usually correlated 
with reforms and democracy, including bureaucratic quality and education, and political 
stability; 3) the correlation is also robust to the variables that are usually associated with 
reforms (but not necessarily with democracy) such as crises, neighboring country effects, and 
compensation schemes; and 4) there is no evidence that economic reforms pave the way for 
political reforms.  
  The strong correlation between (lagged) democracy and the adoption of economic 
reforms, even controlling for many possible omitted factors as well as the finding that past 
economic reforms are not associated with the adoption of democracy, point to the fact there 
is probably a causal link from democracy to reforms. 
  These strong results call for an effort to study the precise mechanisms through 
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Figure 1. Regulation and Democracy Over Time 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1: This figure shows the correlation over time between the indices of democracy on the y-axis (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1) 
and reforms on the x-axis (all the indices are normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the least reformed and 1 to the most reformed) in the following 
eight sectors (or areas) – (i) domestic financial, (ii) capital account, (iii) product markets (electricity and telecommunications), (iv) agriculture, (v) labor, (vi)  trade (based 
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Notes: This figure shows the correlation in 2000 between the indices of democracy on the y-axis (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1) and reforms 
on the x-axis (all the indices are normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the least reformed and 1 to the most reformed) in the following eight sectors (or 
areas) – (i) domestic financial, (ii) capital account, (iii) product markets (electricity and telecommunications), (iv) agriculture, (v) labor, (vi) trade (based on tariffs) and 
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Table 1.  
Reform Indicators 
  Financial sector 
 
The index of domestic financial liberalization is an average of six subindices, five related to banking and one related to 
the securities market.





The banking subindex is an average of the following 5 indicators: (i) interest rate controls, such as floors or ceilings; (ii) 
credit controls, such as directed credit and subsidized lending; (iii) competition restrictions, such as limits on branches 
and entry barriers in the banking sector, including licensing requirements or limits on foreign banks; (iv) the degree of 
state ownership; and (v) the quality of banking supervision and regulation, including power of independence of bank 
supervisors, adoption of Basel capital standards, and a framework for bank inspections.






The sixth subindex relates to securities markets and covers policies to develop domestic bond and equity markets, including 
(i) the creation of basic frameworks such as the auctioning of T-bills, or the establishment of a security commission; (ii) 
policies to further establish securities markets such as tax exemptions, introduction of medium- and long-term 
government bonds to establish a benchmark for the yield curve, or the introduction of a primary dealer system; (iii) 
policies to develop derivative markets or to create an institutional investor’s base; and (iv) policies to permit access to the 
domestic stock market by nonresidents. The subindices are aggregated with equal weights. Each subindex is coded from 
zero (fully repressed) to three (fully liberalized).
Data sources  Abiad and others (2008), following the methodology in Abiad and Mody (2005), based on various IMF reports and 
working papers, central bank websites, and others.
Coverage  1973–2005; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 72 and 91 respectively.
  Capital account 
  Qualitative indicators of restrictions on financial credits and personal capital transactions of residents and financial 
credits to nonresidents, as well as the use of multiple exchange rates. Index coded from zero (fully repressed) to three 
(fully liberalized).
Data sources  Abiad and others (2008), following the methodology in Abiad and Mody (2005), based on various IMF reports and 
working papers, central bank websites, and others.
Coverage  1973–2005; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 72 and 91 respectively.
  Product markets 
Electricity                 
 
The electricity indicators capture (i) the degree of unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution; (ii) whether 
a regulator other than government has been established; and (iii) whether the wholesale market has been liberalized; and 
(iv) privatization. Each subindex is coded from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 2. 
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Telecommunication 
The telecommunication indicator captures (i) the degree of competition in local services; (ii) whether a regulator other 
than government has been established; (iii) the degree of liberalization of interconnection changes; and (iv) privatization. 
Each subindex is coded from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 2.
Data sources 
Electricity: Based on various existing studies and datasets as well as national legislation and other official documents.
Telecommunication: Based on IMF commodities data, various existing studies and datasets, and national legislation and 
other official documents.
Coverage  1960–2003; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 106 and 108 respectively.
  Agriculture market 
 
The index captures intervention in the market for the main agricultural export commodity in each country. The index 
can take four values (i) zero (public monopoly or monopsony in production, transportation, or marketing, e.g., export 
marketing boards); (ii) one-third (administered prices); (iii) two-thirds (public ownership of relevant producers or 
concession requirements); and (iv) one (no public intervention). 
Data sources  Based on IMF commodities data, various existing studies and datasets, and national legislation and other official 
documents.
Coverage  1960–2003; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 96 and 104 respectively.
  Trade  
 
Trade liberalization is defined by looking at average tariff rates, with missing values extrapolated using implicit weighted 
tariff rates. Index normalized to be between zero and unity: zero means the tariff rates are 60 percent or higher, while 
unity means the tariff rates are zero.
Data sources  Various sources, including IMF, World Bank, WTO, UN, Clemens and Willamson, 2004.
Coverage  1960-2005; Minimum and maximum # of countries in any year are 47 and 142 respectively.
  Current account 
 
Current account liberalization is defined with an indicator describing how compliant a government is with its obligations 
under the IMF’s Article VIII to free from government restriction the proceeds from international trade in goods and 
services. The index represents the sum of two subcomponents, dealing with restrictions on trade in visibles, as well as in 
invisibles (financial and other services). It distinguishes between restrictions on residents (receipts for exports) and on 
nonresidents (payments for imports). Although the index measures restrictions on the proceeds from transactions, 
rather than on the underlying transactions, many countries in practice use restrictions on trade proceeds as a type of 
trade restriction. The index is scored between zero and 8 in half-integer units, with 8 indicating full compliance.
Data sources  Based on the methodology in Quinn (1997) and Quinn and Toyoda (2007), drawing on information contained in the 
Fund's AREAER database (Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions).
Coverage  1960–2005; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 50 and 65 respectively.
This table presents brief description of the reform indicators used in the paper. For a full description of all variables, data and sources refer to IMF (2008).  
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Table 2 . Correlation Between Reform Indicators 
   Agriculture  Prod. Mkt Trade Cap. Acc.  Curr. Acc. Finance
Agriculture 1 
Prod. Mkt  0.30***  1 
Trade 0.32***  0.35***  1 
Cap. Acc.  0.40***  0.46***  0.57*** 1 
Curr. Acc.  0.42***  0.47***  0.63*** 0.77***  1 
Finance 0.44***  0.63***  0.62*** 0.73***  0.71***  1 












Reforms and democracy 
Dependent variable: reform in country, sector, year       
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lagged democracy  0.016***  0.017***  0.033***  0.017*** 
Lagged level of index  -0.073*** -0.124***  -0.047*** -0.131***
Country FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Sector FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Country*Sector FE     Y     Y 
Sector*Year FE        Y  Y 
              
Observations  20,123  19,521  20,071  19,521 
              
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive 

















Reforms and democracy, robustness to controls 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lagged democracy  0.011*** 0.014** 0.048***  0.011*** 0.014*** 0.045***
Lagged level of index  -0.149***-0.205***-0.401*** -0.135***-0.173***-0.412***
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)  -0.005*             -0.003 
Lagged real devaluation     0.007           -0.009 
Lagged public expenditure to GDP    0.000           -0.001*
Lagged bureaucratic quality        0.003        0.006*
Lagged tertiary enrollment        0.006        -0.003 
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbor        0.055***    0.044 
Lagged dummy for left              0.003  -0.004 
Lagged dummy for presidential              -0.001  0.006 
                    
Observations  16,648 9,627  5,564  17,804 14,175 4,784 
                    
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. 
All regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year 





Reforms and democracy: Instrumental variables second stage 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)          
   (1a)  (1b)  (1c)  (1d) 
Lagged democracy  0.078*** 0.151*** 0.19  0.141 
Lagged level of index  -0.135*** -0.180*** -0.281*** -0.281***
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)     -0.005  -0.01    
Lagged real devaluation     0.008  0.003    
Lagged public expenditure to GDP     0.000  -0.001    
Lagged bureaucratic quality        0.004    
Lagged tertiary enrollment        0.023    
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbors     0.056  0.053    
Lagged dummy for left     -0.001  -0.001    
Lagged dummy for presidential     0.029**  0.049    
              
Observations  18,970  10,007  5,244  5,244 
First stage F-stat  764.59  229.09  36.47  50.77 
p-value of F test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note.  Lagged democracy is instrumented by (lagged) democracy in neighboring countries. All 
regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. 












Reforms and democracy: Instrumental variables first stage 
Dependent variable: democracy in (country, year)          
   (1a)  (1b)  (1c)  (1d) 
Lagged democracy in neighboring countries  0.014***  0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006***
Lagged level of index  0.022  -0.016  -0.008  -0.005 
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)     -0.015  0.013    
Lagged real devaluation     -0.011  0.020**    
Lagged public expenditure to GDP     0.001  -0.002    
Lagged bureaucratic quality        -0.003    
Lagged tertiary enrollment        -0.199***   
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbors     0.052  0.198***   
Lagged dummy for left     0.001  -0.009*    
Lagged dummy for presidential     -0.226*** -0.238***   
              
Observations  18,970  10,007  5,252  5,252 
              
Note. All regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year 














Reforms and democracy: by reform 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, year)                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Finance Cap. Acc. Prod. Mkt Agricult. Trade  Curr. Acc.
Lagged democracy  0.067*** 0.182***  -0.026  0.202*** 0.075*** 0.179*** 
Lagged level of index  -0.379*** -0.521*** -0.278***  -0.558*** -0.420*** -0.554*** 
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)  0.019*  -0.042*  0.006  -0.016  0.002  0.021 
Lagged real devaluation  -0.007  0.024  -0.01  -0.039*  0.006  -0.012 
Lagged public expenditure to GDP  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.000  -0.003*** -0.001 
Lagged bureaucratic quality  0.014*** 0.022*  0.014*  -0.01  0.012**  0.021** 
Lagged tertiary enrollment  -0.038  0.057  0.109  -0.145  -0.007  0.053 
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbors  -0.01  0.257*  -0.188  -0.147  0.228**  0.013 
Lagged dummy for left  -0.003  -0.008  -0.006  -0.005  -0.001  0.000 
Lagged dummy for presidential  0.037*  0.026  0.041  0.042  0.046**  -0.005 
Observations  786  786  888  807  857  660 
                    
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. All regressions control for 











Table 7a. Reforms and democracy 
Robustness checks 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)                
   (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (3c) 
Lagged democracy  0.007** 0.070*** 0.014*** 0.063***         
Lagged level of index  -0.130*** -0.463*** -0.149***  -0.565*** -0.135*** -0.495*** -0.497***
Democracy dummy (polty2>0)              0.010*** 0.013  0.013 
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)     -0.002     -0.002     -0.002  0.009 
Lagged real devaluation     -0.006     -0.009     -0.009    
Lagged public expenditure to GDP     0.000     -0.001     -0.001    
Lagged bureaucratic quality     0.009**    0.007     0.010**   
Lagged tertiary enrollment     -0.022     0.024     0.011    
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbors  0.063     0.012     0.025    
Lagged dummy for left     -0.005     -0.003     -0.004    
Lagged dummy for presidential     0.010     0.023     -0.007    
                       
Observations  16,816  4,347  15,188  3,338  19,521  4,784  4,784 
                       
Note.  In Columns 1a-1b and 2a-2b, the sample is restricted to communist and developing countries respectively. In Columns 
3a-3b, we use a zero-one definition of democracy (as in Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005), where democracy=1 if polity2 has 
positive values. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. All regressions 
control for country and year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions.  ***, ** and * denote statistical 




Table 7b. Reforms and democracy 
Additional robustness checks 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)                         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Lagged democracy  0.016*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.011***
Lagged level of index  -0.125***-0.495***-0.510***-0.479*** -0.494***-0.523***-0.520***-0.128***
Lagged crisis (inflation>40)  -0.003  -0.001 
Lagged real devaluation  -0.009  -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 
Lagged public expenditure to GDP  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Lagged bureaucratic quality  0.010** 0.009** 0.010***  0.010** 0.007* 0.008**
Lagged  tertiary  enrollment  0.006 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.010 0.010 
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbors  0.038 0.029 0.036 0.026 0.063 0.058 
Lagged dummy for left  -0.004  -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 
Lagged dummy for presidential  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.003 
Lagged reform in trade neighbors  -0.043 
Lagged average reform in other sectors  0.122***
Lagged crisis (growth<0)  -0.007** 
Terms of trade shocks  -0.004 
Lagged crisis (debt)  0.010 
Lagged crisis (bank)  -0.016***
Political reform - Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) 0.015***
                             
Observations  20,123 4,784 4,784 4,769 4,784 4,265 4,265  21,292 19,521
                             
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. In Column (1), instead of explicitly allowing 
for an AR(1) term in the model, the standard errors are clustered at the country-reform level. In Column (8), political reform is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 in the years after democratization. Democratization is defined as the event of becoming a democracy, given that a country was 
not a democracy in the previous year. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions.  




Reforms and democracy - flexible functional form 
Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)          
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lagged democracy (polity2<0.15) 0.014  0.011  -0.005  0.014 
Lagged democracy (0.15<=polity2<0.75) 0.012**  0.009  0.036***  0.01 
Lagged democracy (polity2>=0.75) 0.015***  0.016***  0.038***  0.016*** 
Lagged level of index  -0.073*** -0.129*** -0.036*** -0.135***
Country FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Sector FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Country*Sector FE     Y     Y 
Sector*Year FE        Y  Y 
              
Observations  20,123  19,521  19,980  19,521 
              
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term.   

















Reforms and democracy: feedback effects 
Dependent variable: change in democracy (country, year)          
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lagged democracy  -0.135*** -0.157*** -0.112*** -0.157***
Lagged reform in  (country,  sector, year)  -0.009  -0.011  0.004  -0.010 
Country FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Sector FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
              
Observations  19,043  18,441  19,262  18,441 
              
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** 























Reforms and democracy: feedback effects 
Dependent variable: change in democracy (country, year)             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Finance  Cap. Acc.  Prod. Mkt  Agricult.  Trade  Curr. Acc. 
Lagged democracy  -0.177***  -0.177***  -0.161***  -0.167***  -0.181***  -0.167*** 
Lagged reform in  (country, year)  -0.088**  -0.016  -0.018  0.017  0.011  -0.038* 
Country FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                    
Observations  3,015  3,913  3,195  2,160  2,431  2,160 
                    
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
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Table 10 
Reforms and democracy: Principal component 
  
Dependent variable: 
change in reform index 
(country, year) 
Dependent variable: change 
in democracy (country, year)
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   OLS  IV    
           
Lagged democracy  0.001***  0.006***  -0.218*** 
Lagged level of index  (country,  year)  -0.029***  -0.096***    
Lagged reform in  (country, year)        -1.775 
Country FE  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y 
           
Observations  1,418  1,418  1,303 
First stage F-stat     41    
p-value of F-stat     0.000    
           
Note.  The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. In Column (2), lagged democracy is instrumented by 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in reform index 20,123 0.01 0.08 -1 1
Lagged democracy 20,123 0.59 0.37 0 1
Lagged reform_index 20,123 0.40 0.37 0 1
Lagged crisis (inflation>40) 5,252 0.10 0.30 0 1
Lagged real devaluation 5,252 0.01 0.17 -1.00 1.30
Lagged public expenditure as a percent of GDP 5,252 15.06 5.18 2.98 34.39
Lagged bureaucratic quality 5,252 2.54 1.14 0 4
Lagged tertiary enrollment 5,252 0.27 0.22 0.00 0.97
Lagged reforms in geographical neighbor 5,252 0.02 0.03 -0.21 0.22
Lagged dummy for left 5,252 0.33 0.47 0 1
Lagged dummy for presidential 5,252 0.55 0.50 0 1
Lagged democracy in political neighbors 18,970 1.25 5.12 -9 10
Lagged crisis (growth<0)  5,234 0.26 0.44 0 1
Terms of trade shocks 5,252 -0.01 0.14 -0.70 0.47
Lagged crisis (debt) 4,679 0.01 0.12 0 1
Lagged crisis (bank) 4,679 0.05 0.22 0 1
Political reform (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) 21,919 0.28 0.45 0 1
Lagged reform in trade neighbors 5,252 0.01 0.03 -0.21 0.39
Change in reform index (principal component) 1,418 0.02 0.04 -0.18 0.31
Lagged reform index (principal component) 1,418 0.50 0.25 0 1.00
The summary statistics correspond to samples used in Tables 4, 5, 8a and 8b.
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics 
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Code Country Code Country Code Country
AFG Afghanistan GHA Ghana NLD Netherlands
AGO Angola GIN Guinea NOR Norway
ALB Albania GMB Gambia NPL Nepal
ARE UAE GNB Guinea-Bissau NZL New Zealand
ARG Argentina GNQ Equat Guinea OMN Oman
ARM Armenia GRC Greece PAK Pakistan
AUS Australia GTM Guatemala PAN Panama
AUT Austria GUY Guyana PHL Philippines
AZE Azerbaijan HND Honduras PNG Papua New G.
BDI Burundi HRV Croatia POL Poland
BEL Belgium HTI Haiti PRT Portugal
BEN Benin HUN Hungary PRY Paraguay
BFA Burkina Faso IDN Indonesia QAT Qatar
BGD Bangladesh IND India ROM Romania
BGR Bulgaria IRL Ireland RUS Russia
BHR Bahrain IRN Iran RWA Rwanda
BLR Belarus IRQ Iraq SAU Saudi Arabia
BOL Bolivia ISR Israel SDN Sudan
BRA Brazil ITA Italy SEN Senegal
BTN Bhutan JAM Jamaica SGP Singapore
BWA Botswana JOR Jordan SLB Solomon Is
CAF CAR JPN Japan SLE Sierra Leone
CAN Canada KAZ Kazakhstan SLV El Salvador
CHE Switzerland KEN Kenya SOM Somalia
CHL Chile KGZ Kyrgyz Rep SVK Slovak Rep
CHN China KHM Cambodia SVN Slovenia
CIV Cote D'Ivoire KOR Korea SWE Sweden
CMR Cameroon KWT Kuwait SYR Syria
COG Congo LAO Lao TCD Chad
COL Colombia LBR Liberia TGO Togo
COM Comoros LBY Libya THA Thailand
CRI Costa Rica LKA Sri Lanka TJK Tajikistan
CUB Cuba LSO Lesotho TKM Turkmenistan
CYP Cyprus LTU Lithuania TTO Trinidad Tob
CZE Czech Rep LVA Latvia TUN Tunisia
DEU Germany MAR Morocco TUR Turkey
DJI Djibouti MDA Moldova TWN Taiwan
DNK Denmark MDG Madagascar TZA Tanzania
DOM Dominican Rep MEX Mexico UGA Uganda
DZA Algeria MKD Macedonia UKR Ukraine
ECU Ecuador MLI Mali URY Uruguay
EGY Egypt MMR Myanmar USA US
ERI Eritrea MNG Mongolia UZB Uzbekistan
ESP Spain MOZ Mozambique VEN Venezuela
EST Estonia MRT Mauritania VNM Viet Nam
ETH Ethiopia MUS Mauritius YEM Yemen
FIN Finland MWI Malawi ZAF South Africa
FJI Fiji MYS Malaysia ZAR Zaire
FRA France NAM Namibia ZMB Zambia
GAB Gabon NER Niger ZWE Zimbabwe
GBR UK NGA Nigeria
GEO Georgia NIC Nicaragua
Table A2. Country Codes in Figure 2 
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Country Code Group Country Code Group Country Code Group
Burkina Faso BFA 1 Belarus BLR 1 Bolivia BOL 14
Kyrgyz Rep KGZ 1 China CHN 1 India IND 14
Indonesia IDN 2 Viet Nam VNM 1 Thailand THA 14
Turkey TUR 2 Egypt EGY 2 Chile CHL 15
Colombia COL 3 Morocco MAR 2 Jamaica JAM 15
Paraguay PRY 3 Cameroon CMR 3 Poland POL 15
Ukraine UKR 3 Kazakhstan KAZ 3 Taiwan TWN 15
Madagascar MDG 4 Burkina Faso BFA 4 South Afr ZAF 15
El Salvador SLV 4 Tunisia TUN 4 Australia AUS 16
Bulgaria BGR 5 Jordan JOR 5 Austria AUT 16
Dominican Rep DOM 5 Kenya KEN 5 Belgium BEL 16
Nicaragua NIC 5 Singapore SGP 5 Canada CAN 16
Senegal SEN 5 Ghana GHA 6 Switzerlan CHE 16
Korea KOR 6 Tanzania TZA 6 Czech Rep CZE 16
Romania ROM 6 Albania ALB 7 Germany DEU 16
Argentina ARG 7 Georgia GEO 7 Denmark DNK 16
Philippines PHL 7 Mozambique MOZ 8 Spain ESP 16
India IND 8 Nepal NPL 8 Finland FIN 16
Jamaica JAM 8 Bangladesh BGD 9 UK GBR 16
Bolivia BOL 9 Ecuador ECU 9 Greece GRC 16
Chile CHL 9 Russia RUS 9 Hungary HUN 16
Austria AUT 10 Ukraine UKR 9 Ireland IRL 16
Czech Rep CZE 10 Indonesia IDN 10 Israel ISR 16
Finland FIN 10 Madagascar MDG 10 Italy ITA 16
Greece GRC 10 Colombia COL 11 Japan JPN 16
Lithuania LTU 10 Paraguay PRY 11 Lithuania LTU 16
Portugal PRT 10 El Salvador SLV 11 Netherland NLD 16
Norway NOR 11 Turkey TUR 11 Norway NOR 16
Israel ISR 11 Venezuela VEN 11 New Zeala NZL 16
Japan JPN 11 Argentina ARG 12 Portugal PRT 16
Germany DEU 12 Brazil BRA 12 Sweden SWE 16
Hungary HUN 12 Guatemala GTM 12 Uruguay URY 16
Italy ITA 12 Philippines PHL 12 US USA 16
Belgium BEL 13 Senegal SEN 12
Switzerland CHE 13 Bulgaria BGR 13
Denmark DNK 13 Korea KOR 13
Netherlands NLD 13 Latvia LVA 13
New Zealand NZL 13 Mexico MEX 13












Country Code Group Country Code Group Country Code Group
Oman OMN 1 Turkmenis TKM 1 India IND 15
Turkmenistan TKM 1 Uzbekistan UZB 1 South Afr ZAF 15
Azerbaijan AZE 2 Belarus BLR 2 Chile CHL 16
China CHN 2 China CHN 2 France FRA 16
Lao LAO 2 Egypt EGY 3 Jamaica JAM 16
Viet Nam VNM 2 Pakistan PAK 3 Poland POL 16
Kenya KEN 3 Cameroon CMR 4 Thailand THA 16
Chad TCD 3 Uganda UGA 4 Bolivia BOL 17
Togo TGO 3 Burkina Fa BFA 5 Slovak Rep SVK 17
Solomon Is SLB 4 Tunisia TUN 5 Australia AUS 18
Sierra Leone SLE 4 Kenya KEN 6 Canada CAN 18
Benin BEN 5 Chad TCD 6 Czech Rep CZE 19
Guyana GUY 5 Togo TGO 6 Japan JPN 19
Mozambique MOZ 5 Cote D'Ivo CIV 7 Trinidad T TTO 19
Bangladesh BGD 6 Nigeria NGA 7 Belgium BEL 20
Namibia NAM 6 Georgia GEO 8 Germany DEU 20
Honduras HND 7 Sri Lanka LKA 8 Denmark DNK 20
Madagascar MDG 7 Benin BEN 9 Spain ESP 20
Turkey TUR 7 Guyana GUY 9 Finland FIN 20
Mexico MEX 8 Mali MLI 9 UK GBR 20
Philippines PHL 8 Banglades BGD 10 Greece GRC 20
France FRA 9 Mozambiq MOZ 10 Hungary HUN 20
South Africa ZAF 9 Namibia NAM 10 Ireland IRL 20
Lithuania LTU 10 Nepal NPL 10 Lithuania LTU 20
Trinidad Tob TTO 10 Colombia COL 11 Norway NOR 20
Uruguay URY 10 Venezuela VEN 11 Portugal PRT 20
Czech Rep CZE 11 Honduras HND 12 Sweden SWE 20
Hungary HUN 11 Moldova MDA 12 Switzerlan CHE 21
Japan JPN 11 Malawi MWI 12 Italy ITA 21
Australia AUS 12 Ukraine UKR 12 Mongolia MNG 21
Belgium BEL 12 Indonesia IDN 13 Netherland NLD 21
Canada CAN 12 Madagasc MDG 13 New Zeala NZL 21
Ireland IRL 12 Argentina ARG 14 Uruguay URY 21
New Zealand NZL 12 Bulgaria BGR 14 US USA 21
Portugal PRT 12 Brazil BRA 14
US USA 12 Guatemala GTM 14
Denmark DNK 13 Mexico MEX 14








Table A3 contd. Country Groups in Figure 2.